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ABSTRACT 
 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that deals with gaining knowledge. It is closely related to ontology. The 
branch that deals with questions like “What is real?” and “What do we know?” as it provides these components. 
When using modeling and simulation, we usually imply that we are doing so to either apply knowledge, in particular 
when we are using them for training and teaching, or that we want to gain new knowledge, for example when doing 
analysis or conducting virtual experiments. This paper looks at the history of science to give a context to better cope 
with the question, how we can gain knowledge from simulation. It addresses aspects of computability and the gen-
eral underlying mathematics, and applies the findings to validation and verification and development of federations. 
As simulations are understood as computable executable hypotheses, validation can be understood as hypothesis 
testing and theory building. The mathematical framework allows furthermore addressing some challenges when de-
veloping federations and the potential introduction of contradictions when composing different theories, as they are 
represented by the federated simulation systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The quote that essentially “All models are wrong, but 
some are useful!” is attributed to George E.P. Box. This 
quote raises the question if we can gain knowledge 
from something that is essentially wrong? What are we 
doing when we build models, derive simulations, and 
then execute the simulations? What is the scientific 
justification for applying models? Is simulation really 
the new third column of science as suggested in the 
NSF Report (2006), standing as an equal partner beside 
theory and experimentation? 
 
Within this paper, we will look at several foundations 
for Modeling and Simulation (M&S) to justify why we 
can learn from M&S despite a lot of challenges con-
nected with the epistemology of M&S, which is dealing 
with the theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge 
gained with M&S especially with reference to its limits 
and validity. 
 
We will start with a very limited view on science and 
how we gain understanding using the scientific method. 
As the category of M&S as we are in particular inter-
ested in is computer-based simulation, we will than 
look into computability next. 
 
Finally, we will look at the mathematical foundations of 
M&S, in particular when it comes to the development 
of federations, i.e., more than one independently devel-
oped simulation systems are combined using interoper-
ability protocols to support a common objective. 
 
All these observations lead to the need to revisit our 
ideas of verification and validation to ensure that we 
not only learn “something” from M&S, but that we gain 
knowledge in the epistemological sense. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SCIENCE 
It may seem to be unnecessary to many readers starting 
this paper with a brief history of science, as every 
young student learns the scientific principles in ele-
mentary school already: In order to understand a phe-
nomenon the scientist formulates a hypothesis that pre-
dicts the outcome of an experiment. If the outcome is 
actually observed, the hypothesis is supported and be-
comes an explanation and ultimately can contribute to a 
theory. 
 
This understanding, however, is actually not very old, 
and actually is not even one common understanding. 
Goldman (2006) provides some fundamental insights. It 
goes beyond the scope of this paper to deal with the 
details, but the following observations prepare the 
ground for the arguments used later: 
 
 The British jurist and educational reformer Fran-
cis Bacon is generally recognized as the father of 
the experimental method. He proposed a strictly 
controlled inductive-empirical method to gain 
knowledge: only based on observation and data 
collection, analyses of data can uncover correla-
tions that lead to hypotheses, further testing, con-
firmation, and ultimately the recognition of na-
ture’s law. 
 The French mathematician and philosopher René 
Descartes proposed at the same time an alternative 
approach. He supported the deductive-rational 
method. He put the mathematical model in the 
center and used deductive reasoning to get new 
insights. Experiments are just a tool of limited 
value, as all experiments had to be conducted us-
ing too many constraints and their results were 
often equivocal. 
 Isaac Newton’s work on the “Mathematical 
Principles of Natural Philosophy” (1687) became 
the foundation for scientific work for two and a 
half centuries. His laws could not be deducted 
from experiments, but were consistent with expe-
rience. However, he defined the components of 
his laws in way they supported his mathematics to 
describe the laws. They were neither inductively 
nor deductively derivable from experience or ex-
perimentation, but they allowed a coherent and 
consistent interpretation: a conceptualization of 
experience! 
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Today, we know that many of Newton’s concepts are 
“wrong” – or better stated, they are not generally appli-
cable – as relativity theory and quantum physics did 
lead to new insights and provided alternative views. 
These new concepts are the best we currently have, but 
how can we assume that these new conceptualizations 
are correct and will stand the test of time (and if, for 
how long)? Nonetheless, the laws described by Newton 
were very successfully applied to gain a better under-
standing of nature and, although no longer believed to 
be universally applicable, they are still fundamental in 
today’s school education. Popper (1935) formulated the 
implications of these observations that theories cannot 
be proven to be generally correct, but we can state that 
they have not been falsified so far by new observations 
or insights. 
 
Science is still defined by analyses of data, discovering 
of correlations, and explaining the correlations by cau-
salities that have to be confirmed by observation and 
experimentation. New tools allow more accurate obser-
vations. New conceptualizations provide better struc-
tures to capture the knowledge in coherent frameworks 
… but nobody knows for sure that our current frame-
work is the ultimate truth, or if it is just the best thing 
currently available. 
 
The essence of this little discourse into the history of 
science shall be that science itself is a series of models 
that provide functional causalities leading to observa-
ble correlations. Although wrong from the current per-
spective, they all help mankind to gain new under-
standing about nature or, in other words, to produce 
knowledge that could be applied to solve problems and 
provide solutions. 
 
COMPUTABILITY AND M&S 
In this paper, modeling is understood as the process to 
develop a model while simulation is understood as exe-
cuting such a model. It is therefore understood that 
modeling resides on the abstraction level whereas sim-
ulation resides on the implementation level. Modeling 
identifies the data and the correlation, and provides the 
functionality representing the causality leading to the 
observed correlation. This is done by simplifying and 
abstracting from the observation. As such, a model is a 
purposeful, task-driven simplification and abstraction of 
a perception of reality. Each simulation is therefore an 
implementation of a model, which hopefully is explic-
itly captured in form of a conceptual model (Balci and 
Ormsby, 2007).  
 
The authors are in particular interested in computer 
based simulations, so the aspect of computability be-
comes important. Computability deals with the question 
if something can be executed on a digital computer, and 
in particular whether the functions can be implemented 
as a computer program. 
 
A function is computable when a finite algorithm exists 
that describes what the function is doing, and if the 
function works on a discrete and finite set of arguments. 
Many alternative but equivalent definitions exist that all 
use different models of computation, but the idea of 
discrete and limited range and domain and the existence 
of an algorithm are common features. 
 
Simulations can become very complex and in recent 
history are equipped with impressive means of visuali-
zation. We can create breath-taking virtual worlds that 
seem as real as reality, but all these cannot take away 
the fact that computer-based simulations are made up 
out of computable functions, which means all the con-
straints and limitations of computable functions are 
applicable to simulations as well. 
 
One of these constraints is that certain classes of prob-
lems cannot have an algorithmic solution. Turing 
(1936) described the halting problem as an example and 
gave the proof that no algorithm can exist that solves 
the problem. The problem is the following: “Given a 
program and an input to the program, determine if the 
program will eventually stop when it is given that in-
put.” The well-known proof works with the assumption 
that such an algorithm exists and derives a contradic-
tion. As the only assumption is that such an algorithm 
exists, the contradiction is the proof that such an algo-
rithm cannot exist, as it would lead to the contradiction: 
 
Let us assume we can write the algorithm that 
solves the halting problem. We call it the pro-
gram H. When the program halts, H produces 
‘halt,’ otherwise ‘loop.’  
We use H to construct the program K. K uses H 
and halts, when H produces the output ‘loop,’ 
and when H produces ‘halt,’ it loops forever. 
We can now apply H to K. If H says that K halts 
then K itself would loop, and if H says that K 
loops then K will halt. This cannot be; which 
means H cannot exist. 
 
The observation that many problems exist that cannot 
be decided by an algorithm is directly applicable to 
M&S, as these problems cannot be solved by M&S 
either. Known problems belonging to this class are 
questions like “Will the system terminate?”, “Are two 
modeled actions order independent or do I have to or-
chestrate them?”, “Is the specification complete?”, “Is 
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the specification minimal?”, or “Are two specifications 
functionally equivalent, in other words, do the delivery 
the same functionality?” 
 
Beside these challenges of existence of an effective 
algorithm (decidability of a problem) the challenge of 
finding an efficient algorithm (complexity of a prob-
lem) needs to be addressed as well. Even if we can 
solve a problem effectively, the time needed to solve it 
may be prohibitive to use such a solution in a simula-
tion system. Only effective and efficient algorithms 
make sense for computer-based simulations, which 
limits the number of useful functions significantly in 
comparison with all functions that can be used to ex-
plain correlations. 
 
It is worth to point out that at no point in this argument 
we limited it to a certain paradigm. The observations 
are true for Monte-Carlo simulations, continuous sim-
ulations, discrete event simulation, agent based simula-
tion, and all other imaginable forms of simulation peo-
ple may come up with in the future. The epistemologi-
cal constraints of composability are universal for com-
puter-based simulation. 
 
MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Another aspect becomes obvious when looking at the 
mathematical foundations. A simulation system is a 
production system that applies the procedures captured 
in the system to transform input parameters into output 
parameters. The simulation itself can therefore be un-
derstood as a formal language that produces terms (out-
put parameters) based on observations (input parame-
ters). This justifies the application of model theory 
(Weiss and D’Mello, 1997). 
 
Model theory is a branch of mathematics that deals with 
the interpretation of formal languages using set-theo-
retic structures. In particular, it deals with the equiva-
lency of interpretations in different formal languages. 
The fundamental terms of model theory are the ‘formal’ 
languages that are used to express the concepts to be 
evaluated. In order to interpret a sentence of a language, 
a structure is needed. This structure interprets sentences 
to be true or false. The set of sentences that are inter-
preted to be true builds the theory. Structures are there-
fore understood as the model of a language. The theo-
ries of these models are the sets of true statements in 
these models. The detailed definitions and applications 
in support of M&S are given in Tolk et al. (2013). 
 
We know from the earlier section on computability that 
no general algorithm can exist that decides if two for-
mal system specifications are functionally equivalent. 
However, by using model theory to define M&S allows 
the applications of findings and results already gener-
ally proven to gain new insights. E.g., two simulation 
systems are equivalent if they produce the same sen-
tences at all observed moments. The two results of 
model theory that are directly applicable in support of 
such challenges are Robinson Consistency Theorem and 
Łoś Theorem. Robinson Consistency Theorem simply 
states that the union of two theories is satisfiable under 
a model if and only if their intersections are consistent, 
in other words: there is only one interpretation of truth 
valid in both models. As it is possible that two theories 
are using different languages and the resulting sen-
tences are not comparable, Łoś Theorem generalizes the 
idea of expanding a universe through the Cartesian 
product and defines filters that allow the comparison in 
a common equivalent representation. 
 
Epistemologically, this is a very significant insight, as 
terms like interoperability and composability don’t need 
to be redefined and interpreted, but using formal ap-
proaches allows to unambiguously address when to 
models are equivalent, if transformations between 
model representations and implementations are lossless, 
etc. What was subject of discussions and expert opinion 
now becomes subject of mathematical rigor and proof. 
 
A NEW LOOK AT V&V 
The following graphic was published in Sargent (2007) 
to explain the relations of real world and simulation 
world with Verification and Validation (V&V). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  V&V Relationships (Sargent, 2007) 
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Sargent already made clear that we do not use the real 
system for validation but the system theories that de-
scribe our current understanding of this system. The 
system theories of Isaac Newton’s classic physics, Al-
bert Einstein’s relativity, Werner Heisenberg’s quantum 
physics, and Brian Greene’s string theory are all very 
different, although all try to describe how the observa-
ble world works. When we validate, we validate against 
such a theory, not the real thing. 
 
Utilizing the insights from the earlier section on model 
theory, we do not have to rely on subject matter experts 
and best practices, but we can apply the Robinson Con-
sistency Theorem and Łoś Theorem to proof validity, as 
long as the system theory is provided in form of a for-
mal language. 
 
In addition, user requirements can now be dealt with in 
a similar manner: as mathematically rigorously cap-
tured data! In systems engineering, e.g., validation ac-
tually normally addresses the evaluation if a system 
meets all user requirements, which means requirements 
need to be captured accordingly. The system modeling 
language (SysML) was derived from the universal 
modeling language (UML) for better support of systems 
engineering, but added – among some other changed – 
two important diagrams, namely the requirement dia-
grams that represent a visual modeling of requirements 
for the system, which are pivotal for systems engineer-
ing, and the parametric diagrams that show the rela-
tions between parameters for system components on all 
levels. The diagrams allow for tracing of all other clas-
ses to the requirements from which they are derived (by 
relating them to the requirement diagram) as well as 
introducing metrics to measure the fulfillment of the 
requirements. 
 
This idea was utilized for the development of the Mod-
eling and Simulation System Development Framework 
(MS-SDF) described in Tolk et al. (2013) and shown in 
figure 2. 
 
System theories recognized by the user as well as re-
quirements, assumptions, and constraints are collected 
in mathematically unambiguous form to make up the 
reference model for the simulation. Tolk et al. (2013) 
define “a reference model as an explicit model of a real 
or imaginary referent, its attributes, capabilities and 
relations, as well as governing assumptions and con-
straints under all relevant perceptions and interpreta-
tions. The reference model captures what is known and 
assumed about a problem situation of interest.” As this 
model captures all inputs, it is complete regarding de-
fining elements, but likely not consistent, as contra-
dicting system theories are possible and not aligned 
requirements from different stake holders are highly 
likely. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The M&S System Development Framework   
(Tolk et al. 2013) 
To build a simulation system, however, we need a con-
sistent conceptual model. Robinson (2008) defines a 
conceptual model as “a non-software specific descrip-
tion of the computer simulation model (that will be, is 
or has been developed), describing the objectives, in-
puts, outputs, content, assumptions and simplifications 
of the model.” All this information is captured in the 
reference model, so that a conceptual model can be ex-
tracted by filtering. The filter is defined by the con-
sistency requirement (no contradictions can pass the 
filter) and the relevance requirement (only concepts 
identified in the modeling question can pass the filter). 
In case of contradictions, several conceptual models can 
be derived that illuminate the different aspects of the 
challenge as understood in the reference model. This 
approach was envisioned as multi-simulation in Yilmaz 
et al. (2007). 
 
A good example for the proposed way is the use of 
weather models to predict hurricane paths: instead of 
building one federation of all models, the models are 
used in parallel and their projections are displayed in a 
common context, namely as hurricane tracks with wind 
strength on a map. The common elements shared by all 
weather models are wind strength and coordinates. 
 
The framework allows identifying common concepts 
that can be used to display results side-by-side without 
having to force contradicting theories into one single 
model. Why this approach, the developing of federa-
tions, is epistemologically dangerous will be discussed 
in our last section. 
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DEVELOPING FEDERATIONS 
In particular in the military application domain, the use 
of federations is very common. The idea is intriguing: 
instead of developing new M&S solutions, existing part 
solutions are federated to expose their partial function-
ally so that in the sum the overall need functionality is 
provided to the user by the federation. If, e.g., a closed 
air support operation is needed, an air force model can 
simulate the air crafts while an army model can simu-
late the land-based operations. 
 
The problem with this approach is that we are implicitly 
assuming that all participating simulations support one 
world view. In other words, we are assuming that we 
start from the common ground of a common and ac-
cepted description of reality in form of an object model 
that can serve as the Übermodell from which all simu-
lation representations can be derived by pruning and 
aggregating. But that is not necessarily true. As Tolk et 
al. (2011) explain it: “As we are connecting simulated 
things we need transparency of what we are simulating, 
as the real world referent use in other interoperability 
domains has been replaced in the modeling phase by its 
representing conceptualization in the M&S interopera-
bility domain.” 
 
This is a general problem. Winsberg (2010) uses Nano 
sciences as an example where scientists are interested in 
how cracks evolved and move through material. To 
address this problem, three different levels of resolution 
are necessary. In order to understand how cracks begin, 
sets of atoms governed by quantum mechanics are 
modeled in small regions. These regions are embedded 
into medium scale regions that are governed by molec-
ular dynamics. Finally, most of the material is neither 
cracking nor close to a developing crack and can be 
modeled using continuum mechanics based on linear-
elastic theory. The challenge is that these three theories 
cannot be mapped to each other as they are inconsistent. 
No theory exists that allows creating a common theory. 
However, we can create a federation based on coupling 
heuristics, which Winsberg calls handshakes. In the 
given example, the common expression of energy was 
utilized to exchange information between the regions 
and allow for a common model that executes perfectly 
fine. But what is the foundation? This federation is 
based on three theories that are valid in themselves, but 
the federation is only based on a heuristic supported by 
no theory whatsoever, so can it be valid? 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Let’s summarize the findings before coming back to our 
question posted in the introduction. From the history of 
science we understand that a theory is the best con-
sistent explanation of observables by providing causal-
ity that explains correlations. This causality can be 
captured by functions and relations. We can capture 
these in a model that can be implemented as a simula-
tion. However, when the simulation is computer-based, 
the limitations of computability are given. Model theory 
helps to better understand when models are consistent 
with the implemented theory as well as with additional 
requirements, which is in alignment with ideas of vali-
dation and verification, although these processes need 
to be supported by more rigorous methods. The current 
practice of building federations ignores or is unaware of 
these findings and needs to be revisited. 
 
However, does this mean that we cannot gain 
knowledge from something that is essentially wrong? 
Weirich (2012) makes a strong case that models are still 
very useful, as long as we understand the underlying 
assumptions and constraints. What is needed is a better 
education of M&S engineers to understand the princi-
ples captured in this paper. A simulationists must not 
only be a good computer engineer, he also needs to 
understand the underlying conceptualizations and 
mathematics that are the philosophical foundations on 
which M&S as a discipline is build. Our current M&S 
curricula do not all support this well enough, and the 
need is not yet fully recognized in industry. With this 
paper, we hope to reach some decision makers to ad-
dress these issues better in the future. 
 
The second question posted in the introduction, whether 
simulation stands equally beside theory and experi-
mentation, needs also further discussion (Padilla et al., 
2013). In this paper, the authors observe that simulation 
is either used for theory building, theory testing, or a 
mixed mode thereof. When simulations are used to 
generate data from which new insights are derived, this 
process is the creating of a new theory. If data is com-
pared with empirical evidence, the simulation is tested 
using the methods of theory testing. If empirical data is 
used to test a simulation and afterwards the simulation 
is used to generate new data to be evaluated, we have a 
mixed form. In all cases, the simulation either stands in 
place of the theory, or in the place of the experimenta-
tion. Again, there is a vast amount of methods applica-
ble that has been developed of centuries of theory and 
simulation development. Simulationists must know 
what they are doing and which methods are applicable. 
 
M&S as a discipline is still young and in development. 
That is why it is even more important to address these 
questions and embed it into the context of other scien-
tific disciplines. 
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